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Abstract
Much has been written about politicians’ preferences for electoral systems, yet
little is known about the preferences of voters. In 1993, New Zealand had a binding
electoral referendum on the same day as the general election where voters chose
between keeping a single plurality system (First Past the Post) or introducing a
pure proportional one (Mixed Member Proportional). This paper merges data from
all nationwide polling stations to Census data on local voters to examine what
drives citizens’ preferences for an electoral system. We find that strategic partisan
interest was a key driver: voters overwhelmingly preferred the system that most
benefited their favorite party. However, socioeconomic characteristics and social
values also mattered; people who held more progressive values, were outside the
dominant religion and lived in urban areas were much more likely to vote to change
to a proportional system. Survey data show that these findings hold at the individual
level, and further, that individuals who were angry with the economy were much
more likely to vote against the status quo, regardless of their background, party
preferences or social values. This behavior is likely to have ultimately balanced the
result in favor of Mixed Member Proportional.
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1 Introduction
A country’s electoral system is a key determinant of many of its political outcomes. How
politicians are elected has been shown to matter for the degree of female representation
(Duverger, 1955; Norris, 1985; Matland and Studlar, 1996), the level of redistribution
(Iversen and Soskice, 2006; Persson et al., 2007), the level of corruption (Persson et al.,
2003), party dynamics (Duverger, 1951; Kedar et al., 2016), public spending (Milesi-
Ferretti et al., 2002; Lizzeri and Persico, 2001) and a wide range of policy outcomes
(Morelli, 2004).1 Given the impact that this choice has on policy outcomes and hence
welfare, it is critical to understand how countries end up with different electoral systems
out of a wide range of possible alternatives. The existing literature on this topic has
mainly focused on politicians’ preferences, likely because they are the most visible actors
in the process of choosing an electoral system. So far, a key actor who has been generally
overlooked is the electorate. This paper aims to fill this gap.
One of the reasons citizens’ preferences have likely been overlooked is the relative
scarcity of past electoral system changes that included mechanisms for popular partici-
pation. Between 1961 and 2011, there were only twenty-four relatively serious attempts
to change electoral systems in OECD democracies, with only nine changes being realized
(Bol, 2016). In this paper, we focus on one of these serious attempts, which also hap-
pened to be a successful one: New Zealand, which, until 1993, was “a perfect example
of the Westminster model of democracy” (Lijphart, 1984), with all Members of Parlia-
ment (MPs) selected from single member plurality districts and with only two parties
alternating office between 1938 and 1993. Specifically, in 1993, New Zealanders faced a
binary choice between keeping a long-established First Past The Post system (FPTP) or
changing to a proportional system known as Mixed Member Proportional (MMP). This
binding referendum had very high turnout (85 percent of the eligible electorate voted).
In the end, 54 percent of voters chose MMP, which became the new electoral system in
1996, when the following general election took place.
Our main analysis uses data from all 4,273 polling stations in New Zealand, which
we geocoded. We merged this data set with the Census in order to obtain the socioeco-
nomic characteristics of voters at each polling station. Hence, we can closely examine the
relationship between voting outcomes and voter characteristics. Importantly, the general
election (still under FPTP) was held at the same time as the referendum. As a result, for
1See (Carey and Hix, 2013) and (Grofman, 2016) for a comprehensive summary.
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each polling station, we know the party shares and also the proportion of votes for MMP.
This allows us to examine the role of partisanship as well as socioeconomic characteristics
in determining citizens’ preferences for an electoral system. Since the average station has
only 450 voters, our analysis is undertaken at a very low level of aggregation, which means
that we are able to control for a wide range of location-specific characteristics.
We also perform two additional analyses to support our main findings. First, a small
subset of 150 urban polling stations had polling booths for two or even three nearby
electoral districts. In these cases, the socioeconomic characteristics of the electorate in
each district are nearly identical, while for historical reasons, the preferred party in these
neighboring districts often differs. This allows us to estimate polling station fixed effects
models that examine the relationship between past party voting patterns and referen-
dum voting controlling for all unobservable socioeconomic characteristics. Second, we use
survey data from the 1993 New Zealand Election Study (NZES) to examine the same
question using individual level data. Notably, the survey contains information on party
support, referendum vote, general election vote and a wide range of socioeconomic char-
acteristics and political attitudes. This is critical since this data allows us to examine
individual-level relationships while controlling for a wider range of individual preferences
and opinions.
We find robust evidence that partisan preferences drove voters’ choices; people sup-
ported the system that was thought to most benefit their favorite party. This is the case
when examining the full cross-section of polling stations, when examining only polling
stations with polling booths for more than one electorate, and when using the NZES data
to examine individual voting behavior. Importantly, results using survey data are robust
to controlling for socioeconomic characteristics, self-placement on a left-right ideological
scale and support for different political parties. Even with these controls, the party an
individual votes for strongly predicts how they voted in the referendum. Interestingly,
supporters’ voting patterns seem to strongly mimic party cues: National was undoubtedly
in favor of the status quo, and so were their supporters. Labour, the other big party, did
not send a clear message, and we likewise find ambivalence among its base core. When it
comes to smaller parties, their leaders strongly encouraged change to MMP. We find that
their supporters overwhelmingly voted for MMP.
However, partisan preferences do not fully explain electoral system choice. Socioe-
conomic characteristics and social values also matter; people who hold more progressive
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values, are more educated, are outside the dominant religion, are male, and live in urban
areas were much more likely to support changing to a proportional system. Survey data
confirms these findings at the individual level and, notably, also shows that individuals
who were angry with the economy were much more likely to vote against the status quo,
regardless of their background, party preferences or social values.
It is important to emphasize that these preferences cannot result from a distaste for
malapportionment or gerrymandering, which are both non-existent in New Zealand due to
an electoral law that strictly bounds the electoral commission against both, which results
in electorate boundaries being completely arbitrary. It is most likely that the patterns we
uncover reveal an intrinsic preference for particular democratic processes. Supporting this,
we also find that individuals who put intrinsic value on characteristics usually associated
with proportional systems, such as coalition governments and a fair mapping from votes
to seats, are also much more likely to support MMP.
The main contribution of our paper is that, to the best of our knowledge, it is the first
to use field data from a binding referendum to examine individual determinants of electoral
system choice.2 The referendum we examine is particularly relevant for understanding
individual preferences because all adult New Zealanders had an equal say in the outcome.
There had been a non-binding referendum in the previous year on the same decision,
which means that the issue of electoral system reform was extremely salient. The few
studies that have previously examined individual preferences for electoral systems have
mainly relied on hypothetical choices made in surveys, and on experiments by participants
in contexts where an actual electoral reform was not on the agenda (Blais et al., 2015;
Aldrich et al., 2014; Wenzel et al., 2000). Despite the strengths of these papers, they all
have in common that respondents were answering questions regarding a relatively abstract
and unlikely event.3 Lack of saliency has been shown to be a problem in survey-based
studies, since it results in satisficing and socially desirable answers (Krosnick , 1999).
In general, our results are consistent with previous literature which also finds that
voters are usually self-interested in hypothetical situations (Aldrich et al., 2014; Wenzel
et al., 2000) 4. In this light, our results confirm that hypothetical choice experiments
2Nakaguma (2015) uses a similar strategy to understand preferences for the form of government,
presidential versus parliamentary, using data from the 1993 Brazilian referendum.
3The only exceptions we know of are Aimer and Miller (2002) which also examines the New Zealand
referendum but only uses the NZES in a descriptive manner and Fournier et al. (2011) which examines
a sample of citizens who chose to be part of a long-term deliberative process (one year, 20+ meetings).
As the authors acknowledge, this has obvious self-selection issues.
4Fournier et al. (2011) is an exception but relied on self-selected participants who were all members
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are a reasonable way to collect information about individual’s preferences for different
electoral systems, and that salience does not appear to change the underlying importance
of partisanship in determining people’s choices. However, this paper is the first one to show
that social values are also important determinants of individual preferences for electoral
systems, and, in particular, that voter anger could have played a small but determinant
role on the referendum outcome.5 This type of sentiment is obviously difficult to capture
in hypothetical situations and, as the evidence from the Brexit referendum and 2016 US
Presidential election suggest, in pre-election polling. Taken together, our results highlight
how the timing of any referendum may be a key determining factor, especially in relatively
close races where economic or political dissatisfaction could sway enough votes to overturn
expected results.
2 Theoretical framework
The literature on the origins of electoral systems has mostly focused on the role played by
political elites. As a result, the analysis of preferences for electoral systems has primar-
ily paid attention to candidates – or, more generally, parties or policymakers. Broadly
speaking, two reasons have been put forth to explain why different parties prefer different
electoral systems: self-interest and general-interest (Bawn, 1993; Benoit, 2004; Boix, 1999;
Bowler et al., 2006; Colomer, 2004; Norris, 2011). Self-interest preferences reflect each
party’s expectations about the payoffs that different electoral institutions will have either
in the form of policy outcomes or perks from office. General-interest preferences refer
more broadly to preferences for institutional outcomes that affect the general, rather than
partisan, interest. That is, related to issues of fairness, governability or accountability,
and usually related in some way to the political processes rather than outcomes for specific
parties.6
There is little previous research on voters’ preferences for electoral systems. The ex-
ceptions have generally assumed that voters like political parties have rational preferences
that align with their political goals and values. In particular, previous research has found
of local assemblies in the Netherlands, Ontario and British Columbia.
5Voter anger was particular relevant at the time of this referendum because in the late 1980s New
Zealand underwent a massive free-market de-regularization where campaign promises had been repeatedly
broken by both major parties (Roper and Leitch, 1995)
6However rational political agents may be assumed to be, the literature also recognizes that most
electoral reforms cannot simply be explained by short-term self interest motivations (see, for instance,
Benoit (2004); Katz (2005); Norris (2011).
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that self-interested preferences are a key explanation for how voters rank different electoral
systems. In other words, voters generally prefer systems that benefit their most preferred
party (Wenzel et al., 2000; Aldrich et al., 2014; Blais et al., 2015; Weber, 2017).7 Given
that both under FPTP and MMP local representatives are chosen via majoritarian rule
at the district level, we posit that voters have the national level in mind (i.e., government
presence or representation in parliament). In light of this, our first prediction is as follows:
Hypothesis 1. [Partisan]: Voters support the electoral system that most favors
their preferred party at the national level.
Note that when it comes to casting a vote, preference for the system that most favors
one’s most preferred party is observationally equivalent to having no strict preference for
(or knowledge about) any of the systems and basing the choice on one’s preferred party’s
recommendation. Without information on the information available to voters, it is not
possible to separate these two channels.
Alternatively, voters could rank electoral systems on self-interested preferences that
go beyond strict partisan lines. According to social dominance theory, members of high
status groups should support institutions that favor their group. Hence, if the political
system as a whole and the electoral system, in particular, were deemed to play a role in
the maintenance of social hierarchies, the optimal strategy for high socioeconomic status
voters (high-SES) would be to support the status quo, whereas those with lower-SES
should be voting to overturn it.8 This prediction is summarized as follows:
Hypothesis 2. [Status quo]: High-SES voters are in favor of maintaining FPTP,
whereas lower-SES voters are in favor of MMP.
Individuals’ own ideological self-placement in the left-right spectrum could also have
consequences on their attitudes towards different electoral systems. For instance, Bowler
et al. (2006) argue that right-wing voters should be “reluctant to support changes of any
kind and, thus, express more affect for the current institutional arrangements” (p. 437).
Blais et al. (2015) summarize a number of political psychology studies and conclude that
“left-wing voters [should be] more attracted by new voting rules” (p. 428). Left-wing
7In particular, Aldrich et al. (2014) show that when voters expect a landslide victory of their favorite
party, they prefer a ‘winner-take-all’ system, whereas when they are uncertain that their party will get
the majority of votes, they prefer a proportional split. This is consistent with elites’ choices as shown in
Trebbi et al. (2008).
8See Sidanius et al. (1994) and all work cited therein for a discussion on hierarchy-enhancing ideologies
and social dominance theory. This hypothesis is also consistent with prospect theory: in their seminal
piece, Quattrone and Tversky (1988) show that in the political arena people behave similarly as when
making economic decisions. I.e., risk-averse in gains and risk-seeking in losses.
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voters could also be more supportive of MMP because historically it has been proven that
governments elected using PR on average provide higher levels of redistribution ((Persson
and Tabellini, 2004); (Iversen and Soskice, 2006)). In light of these, we make the following
prediction:
Hypothesis 3. [Ideology] Voters on the right of the political spectrum will be in
favor of the status quo, whereas those to the left will prefer a change.
Previous work has also tested whether voters’ preferences can also be shaped by a
general interest, which refers to preferences for securing a set of fair and clean political
processes, such as fairness, transparency, representativity or accountability (Fournier et
al., 2011; Nakaguma, 2015; Wenzel et al., 2000). That is, as the case for political elites,
preferences for institutional outcomes that affect the general, rather than partisan, inter-
est. These motives can be distinguished from the ones exposed thus far as being strictly
based on selfless interest. For instance, Nakaguma (2015) rationalizes Brazilian’s choice
for a presidential system in 1993 as a means to reduce corruption. Wenzel et al. (2000)
find that citizens who prefer more consensual decision-making processes (as opposed to
strong government efficacy) are more supportive of a proportional representation system,
whereas Aldrich et al. (2014) find that preferences for an electoral system are correlated
with socio-economic background: in particular, the younger and more educated are more
supportive of a proportional rule. Based on these, we make the following prediction:
Hypothesis 4. [Values] Voters support the electoral system they believe most favors
their preferred set of political processes and rules.
Finally, a number of recent papers have identified the phenomena of protest voting,
i.e., voting for a party other than one’s favorite in order to signal political dissatisfaction
(McAllister, 1982).9 There is no reason to believe protest voting should not exist in
referenda. In fact, just to name two recent ones, voting for Brexit in 2016 or turning out
to vote (for either option) in the 2017 Catalan independence poll have been regarded as
‘protest votes’ (Goodwin and Heath, 2016; Kauffman, 2016; Lynskey, 2017; News Europe
, 2017). This leads to our final prediction:
Hypothesis 5. [Protest] Voters who are discontent with the economic and political
situation cast a vote against the status quo, regardless of their preferences.
In our scenario, this translates into voting for MMP. As discussed below, our main
9See, for instance, Hooghe and Dassonneville (2018); Kselman and Niou(2011) or Pop-Eleches (2010).
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analysis links polling station data to census information on local areas. This data can
only be used to test the first two predictions discussed here as we do not have information
on voter ideology, values or discontent. However, our secondary analysis using data from
the New Zealand Election Survey is able to both confirm our main findings for the first
two predictions, and test the next three predictions discussed above.
3 New Zealand context
3.1 Events leading to the referendum: 1978 - 1993
New Zealand was throughout most of the 19th century “a perfect example of the West-
minster model of democracy” (Lijphart, 1984). Government was (and still is) elected by
the Parliament, which is the only legislative chamber in the country. Up to and including
the 1993 election, all MPs were selected from single member plurality districts. Due to
an electoral law that strictly bound the electoral commission against malapportionment
by mapping district size to the population in the South Island, the number of districts
incremented regularly throughout the years, from 80 in the immediate post Second World
War, to 99 in 1993. Conservative National and leftist Labour were the only two parties
in office between 1938 and 1993, winning nearly all MPs in each election.
Both the 1978 and 1981 elections ended up with National in office even though Labour
won the plurality of votes. This resulted in a Labour pledge to establish a Royal Commis-
sion of non-partisan individuals to reappraise the electoral law. The Commission’s report
suggested that the best possible system for New Zealand was a proportional system known
as Mixed Member Proportional (MMP). Perhaps unsurprisingly, “ [h]orrified politicians of
both major parties (then) attempted to put the genie of reform back in the bottle” (Nagel
(2004), page 534). This effort was successful until David Lange, the Labour candidate in
the 1987 elections, promised a binding referendum during a TV debate if Labour won the
elections. This promise has been widely regarded as a political gaffe.10
Despite a Labour victory in 1987, the referendum was never set. Given the rising
concerns about fairness and representation among large sectors of the population, the
National party, in an attempt to shame Labour, promised a binding referendum in case
they won the 1990 elections, to which Labour followed suit. Party elites mostly opposed
10It was “made in a context of ongoing pressure for a referendum on the electoral system, increasing
public dissatisfaction with the political process and intensifying concern about the government’s willing-
ness to override public opinion” (Vowles (2008), page 24).
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the referendum, yet realized it was politically perilous to do so publicly (Vowles, 2008).
National then won the 1990 elections and proceeded to set a two-stage process for deciding
the electoral system. A first referendum, held in 1992, was non-binding; it asked citizens
whether they would prefer to remove FPTP, and, if so, to choose which was the best
possible alternative among four suggested.11 If voters in the first referendum supported
change, there would then be a second binding referendum in 1993 asking voters to choose
between FPTP and the highest ranked alternative from the first referendum.
Not surprisingly, given its non-binding nature, participation was relatively low in the
1992 referendum (55.2%). However, an overwhelming majority voted to replace FPTP
(84.7%) and among the four candidates to replace it, MMP was the most preferred,
with seven in ten voters supporting it as the best alternative. Notably, the context in
New Zealand in the late 80s was of great disengagement with politics and politicians,
during which both Labour and National had implemented a drastic liberalization of the
economy. As former Labour Prime Minister Mike Moore stated, “[T]he people didn’t
speak [on referendum day]. They screamed.” Levine and Roberts (1993), page 162).
The stage was now set for the binding referendum to be held at the same time as
the 1993 general election. Few members of the National Party now supported change.
Senior Labour politicians were giving cues to vote against MMP, whereas those closer
to the voters (such as key activists and less tenured candidates) generally supported
MMP (Vowles, 2008). Smaller parties, like Alliance or New Zealand First (NZF), were
unambiguously supportive of MMP. In a last minute attempt to prevent MMP, a group
of business leaders stepped into the breach left by demoralized politicians, by launching a
lavishly funded, sophisticated advertising blitz in support of FPTP, called ‘Campaign for
Better Government’ (Roper and Leitch, 1995). Panel B of Table 1 summarizes the vote
shares and seats won by the major parties in the general election, as well as their position
with regard to the referendum.
[Table 1 about here]
The 1993 referendum saw a sharp increase in participation (85.2%) and a much closer
result: MMP was preferred by 53.9% of voters (referendum official results are summarized
in Panel A of Table 1). The new electoral law established MMP for the 1996 general
election and required it to be used for at least two consecutive elections before any serious
11The four possible alternatives were Single Transferable Vote (STV), Supplementary Member (SM),
Alternative Vote (AV) and Mixed Member Proportional (MMP).
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evaluation could be made.12 Overall, the process that culminated in this referendum has
been described as “driven by chance” (Benoit, 2007), “serendipity” (Nagel, 2004), or even
“accidental” (Vowles, 2008).
3.2 Mixed Member Proportional: a brief summary
The Electoral Commission proposal for MMP (which is what was implemented after
the referendum) is very similar to the electoral system that prevails in Germany. The
country is divided into electoral districts with the number of districts determined by total
population; it was 65 in 1996, right after the implementation of MMP, and is at the time
of writing this article 71, all nearly equal in population. The number of MPs, however, is
fixed at 120.13 On election day, citizens cast two votes: the ‘party vote’ and the ‘electorate
vote’. All nationwide party votes are tallied together (i.e., as if one district). Vote shares
from the party vote determine the share of votes that a party will get in parliament. The
electoral formula chosen was Sainte-Laguë, which means that the translation from party
vote shares to seat shares in parliament is nearly exact.14 The electorate vote, on the
other hand only serves to decide who is the representative at the local level; here plurality
rule still abides. 15
3.3 Other relevant aspects of the New Zealand electoral system
One peculiarity of the New Zealand system is the existence of Māori-only electorates.
These special electorates were introduced in 1867 under the Māori Representation Act.
As a consequence, every area in New Zealand is covered by both a General and a Māori
electorate. By law, Māori citizens (around one sixth of the total population) can choose
whether to register in a General district, or in a district in which only Māori can enroll
(and vote). All non-Māori citizens must enroll in the General roll. From 1896 to 1993,
12A non-binding referendum was held in 2011, in which 57% of the population voted to keep MMP.
13Unless there is an ’overhang’, a situation in which the number of MPs may increase in very small
numbers. Overhang situations arise when a party wins more districts than the number of MPs designated
via the party vote.
14Parties are required to get greater than five percent of the overall party vote or win an electoral seat
to get their full allocation of seats in parliament.
15As an example, suppose that a party wins 35% of the party votes and wins in 20 of the 71 electorates
with the ‘electorate vote’. Given that 35% of 120 is 42, this party gains 42 MPs. The first 20 MPs are
those who have won the local race via the electorate vote. The other 22 are the first 22 members of the
nationwide party list. On the other hand, if a party wins more electorates than the MPs allocated with
its share of the party vote, then a situation of an overhang arises. For example, if a party wins 6% of the
party votes (which translates into 7 MPs) and 9 electorates, then the number of total MPs rises to 122,
and the party gets to keep all its 9 locally elected MPs.
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the number of Māori seats was fixed at four. Figure 1 shows all electorates in a map.
Changing to MMP had a particularly large impact for Māori. It was decided that
if MMP was implemented the number of Māori seats would no longer be fixed at four.
Instead, they would now depend upon the number of Māori registered in the Māori Roll
(following the same population rules as the electorates in the General Roll). Importantly,
this would mean that the number of Māori-only districts could dramatically increase in
the long run if more Māori chose to register in the Māori Roll (“Electoral Act, 1993”).16
Currently, there are seven Māori seats.17
[Figure 1 about here]
Important for the interpretation of some of our findings, New Zealand has strong rules
against malapportionment. Specifically, the Electoral Amendment Law of 1945 states
that the registered population in any given district could not be more or less than 500
people of the established quota, which was later modified in 1950 to deviate by at most ±
7.5% and in 1956 by at most ± 5%, where it has stayed ever since.18 Hence, redistricting
is an uncommon phenomena driven entirely by population change. Because of the fixed
number of Māori seats, Māori are the only group in New Zealand who ‘lost out’ under
FPTP due to how the electoral map was drawn.
Another important detail relevant for implementing our empirical strategy is that while
voters in New Zealand can vote in any polling station within their electorate, historically
nearly all have chosen to cast their votes on election day at the closest polling station.19
While it is possible to vote in another electorate on election day if an individual is traveling,
this requires a ‘special’ vote and is relatively costly in terms of paperwork. Hence, the
sociodemographic characteristics of individuals living in the area near a polling station
can be thought of as a very accurate representation of the preferences of the voters at
that station.
16The “Electoral Act (1993)”, reprinted as of July 1, 2017, can be found at http://www.legislation.
govt.nz/act/public/1993/0087/latest/DLM307519.html.
17Labour traditionally won all of the Māori seats which may be an additional reason why many party
members were supportive of changing to MMP.
18Electoral Amendment Act, 1945, Nov. 12, No. 10; Electoral Amendment Act, 1950, Oct. 6, No. 32;
Electoral Amendment Act, 1956, Oct. 26, No. 107.
19According to the ‘Voter and non-Voter Survey Report’ issued by the Electoral Commission, 93%
voted in a polling station closest to their home in 2008, whereas 92% did so in 2011. There is no data
available for previous elections, but there is no reason to suspect that patterns have recently changed in
any particular direction.
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4 Data and empirical strategy
4.1 Data
Our main analysis relies on data that we combined from two different datasets that cover
the whole country: (i) election and referendum results at the polling station level and
(ii) the general Census. The general election and referendum results dataset contains
information from all 4,273 polling stations, with an average of 449 votes cast in each. In
order to infer the sociodemographic characteristics of voters at each polling station, we
geolocate them and merge comprehensive information on individuals living in the area
of the polling station from the 1996 Census.20 Since 1996, Statistics New Zealand has
released comprehensive sociodemographic information at the “Area Unit” level. There are
nearly 2,000 area units in New Zealand, which are generally suburbs in urban areas, small
towns or district rural areas, and have on average 1,884 usual residents. Most area units
(73%) have one or at most two polling stations in them. Hence, the characteristics of
individuals living in the area unit of a polling station should be quite representative of
the voters at that station.21 We also use separate information at the area unit level on
the proportion of Māori registered in the General Roll versus the Māori Roll.22
We drop all “special vote polling stations”, which include hospital votes, ordinary votes
and special votes before polling day, special votes on polling day and overseas votes.23
We do so because we do not have information on the sociodemographic characteristics
of these voters, which is critical to our empirical strategy. Given the potential bias in
preferences among Māori driven by the “Electoral Act (1993)” (see Section 3.3 above), we
also exclude polling stations from the Māori Roll. Our final analysis sample includes data
from 1, 637, 117 voters at 3,244 polling stations, which covers 85.4% of the total number
of votes cast in the election. Table 2 shows basic information on these polling stations
for the full sample and our analysis sample. There is no apparent bias in terms of party
or electoral system preferences in our restricted analysis sample of polling stations. In
the Supplementary Materials, we show that all our results hold when we include polling
20We are able to geolocate all but seven polling stations which we exclude from our analysis.
21The few area units that have three or more polling stations are generally large ones in rural areas.
In the Supplementary Materials (Tables IV, VI and VIII) we show that when we cluster standard errors
at the area unit level all results hold.
22This dataset is not publicly available and was obtained directly from the Electoral Commission. It
contains data from 1998. Since the changes in roll composition were minor from 1993 to 1998, we take
this as an adequate proxy for the 1993 roll composition.
23A special vote is a vote made by an elector who is unable to visit a polling place in their own electorate
on election day, or is not on the electoral roll on election day.
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stations in Māori districts.
[Table 2 about here]
Finally, in Section 5.3, we use survey data from the 1993 New Zealand Election Study
(NZES). This was a post-election survey that was administered through a self-completion
questionnaire. 2,251 individuals responded (around 70% of those initially targeted). This
survey included questions on referendum choice and party choice for the elections, as
well as the usual battery of questions on sociodemographics, party preferences, political
attitudes, social values, etc. As discussed above, we use the NZES to test whether our
main results hold up when examining individual voting behavior and to examine the
importance of additional characteristics that can only be captured in a survey for voting
decisions.
4.2 Empirical strategy
Our main unit of observation is the polling station matched to the sociodemographic
characteristics of voters in the Area Unit in which the station is located. Our main
regression specification is as follows:









where %MMPi is the percentage of votes for MMP in polling station i ; Xia is a vector
of sociodemographic characteristics of Area Unit a in which polling station i is located;
and %Pi is the share of votes for party P in polling station i.24 We include the vote
share in a quadratic form because, as will be shown below, there appears to be a non-
linear relationship between vote shares and voting for MMP. Because there are multiple
polling stations in the same electorate, we cluster all standard errors at this level. We
weight all results by number of votes at the polling station, so that our results indicate
the relationship for the average voter as opposed to the average polling station.
24Table II in the Supplementary Materials shows the descriptive statistics for the sociodemographic




Figure 2 shows the distribution of results at the electorate and polling station levels. There
was a wide distribution of voting results in the referendum; in some polling stations less
than 20% of people supported changing to MMP while in others over 80% of voters
supported the change. Table 3 reports the OLS results of regressing the share of votes
for MMP on sociodemographic characteristics (i.e., expression (1) above without party
shares).25 Some patterns stand out: urban areas and areas with a higher proportion
of residents born abroad strongly supported MMP; similarly, the higher educated and
those who were more dependent on the state subsidies for income were more supportive
of MMP. Māori and women seemed also more supportive of MMP, although these results
are not robust to all specifications. Finally, results on the coefficients for income indicate
a hump-shaped relationship between income and preferences for MMP.26
[Figure 2 about here]
[Table 3 about here]
[Figure 3 about here]
[Figure 4 about here]
[Table 4 about here]
Next, we examine the correlation between partisan support and electoral system
choice. Figure 3 shows the geographical distribution of support for MMP (Panel a) and
for the three biggest parties (Panels b − d). These figures suggest a strong correlation
between party support and electoral system choice: whereas National strongholds were
more supportive of FPTP, areas where Alliance and Labour were predominant showed a
stronger support for MMP. Figure 4 further examines this by plotting the unconditional
relationship between party support and support for MMP. Support for MMP linearly de-
creases with support for National. Similarly. the relationship between support for Labour
or Alliance and support for MMP is positive. However, we should not that, after a certain
25Our preferred specification in all tables is the last column. We report different specifications to
provide evidence that results are consistent throughout, and not a result of our particular choice.
26Table III in the Supplementary Materials shows that results are robust to including all polling stations
from Māori electorates.
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threshold, support for MMP does not seem to increase, however extreme the support for
either of these parties.
Table 4 reports the OLS results of regressing the share of votes for MMP on sociode-
mographic characteristics and party shares (i.e., expression (1) above).27 All patterns just
discussed hold. When controlling for all sorts of socioeconomic characteristics, National
supporters prefer FPTP, Labour strongholds show moderate support for MMP, and sup-
porters of Alliance strongly prefer MMP. The negative sign on the squared party vote
shares for Labour (column 2) and Alliance (columns 3 and 4) further supports non-linear
relationship between vote shares for these parties and support for MMP that is hinted in
Figure 4.
Figure 5 shows the magnitude of these effects by plotting predicted support for MMP
from results in Table 4 —i.e., controlling for all sociodemographic characteristics. All
graphs use the same scale for ease of comparison of the magnitude of the effect. Two
main lessons arise: first, the stronger effect is for National: for every percentage point
increase in vote shares for National, there’s a drop of around 0.5 percentage points in
support for MMP. In comparison, the effect for Alliance, while unambiguous in favor of
MMP, is much smaller: for every percentage point increase in vote shares for Alliance,
there’s an increase of around 0.25 percentage points in support for MMP. And, second, the
results for Labur seem to perfectly mimic the ambiguity (or lack of consistency) displayed
by its party leaders: the relationship is a near perfect U-shape.
[Figure 5 about here]
5.2 Matched Polling Stations
In New Zealand, citizens can cast their vote at any polling station within the electorate
they are registered in.28 Especially in urban areas, there are voters —mainly those who
live at the edge of their electorate— for whom the closest polling station is located in
the electorate next to the one they are registered. Historically, in order to facilitate
participation and reduce the costs of voting, the electoral commission has decided to set
polling booths for two electorates in the same polling station (sometimes, in some corners,
27Table V in the Supplementary Materials shows that all results hold when including Māori and votes
in polling stations that are not located geographically (i.e., “special” votes).
28Technically, citizens can also cast their vote in other electorates, but this involves a serious amount
of paperwork and very few voters resort to it.
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for even three electorates). Importantly, votes are tallied separately by electorate within
those polling stations. There are approximately 150 such polling stations.
As discussed above, we focus on these stations for one of our robustness tests. Table 5
illustrates our approach with examples from three of these stations, (Forrest Hill Church
Hall, K.C.E.P.B. Depot, and King George Hall). Figure I in the supplementary materials
illustrates the case of a particular polling station serving both North Shore and Glenfield
electorates in a map.
[Table 5 about here]
The three examples shown in Table 5 reveal that differences in results across ballot
boxes within the same polling station can be striking. We use this to set a pairwise
matching strategy. Given that the vast majority of citizens vote in the closest polling
station, all voters in any such polling station i can be safely assumed to share the same
socioeconomic characteristics, regardless of the electoral district booth they effectively
cast their vote in (section B in the supplementary materials confirms that this is a valid
assumption). Essentially, electorates are completely arbitrary boundaries and, in urban
areas, all polling booths draw from a local area since they are densely located. Hence,
people who vote in the same polling booth are mainly coming from the same neighborhood,
they just happen to reside in different electorates. As (Gibson et al., 2013) note, “New
Zealand appears to have ample polling places per voter. Electorates in New Zealand each
have an average of about 50 polling places, and at each an average of just 600 votes are
cast in the 10 hours that the polls are open. (...) The average distance by road to the
nearest polling place in urban areas is one kilometer (0.6 miles). This is comparable to
the distances found in previous US studies. Based on this distance, the average round trip
by car to the nearest polling place would take just five minutes of traveling time, while
for urban areas it would take only four minutes. (pages 3 and 7)”
As a result, differences in partisan support and electoral system choice across voting
booths in the same polling station must be driven by unobservables at the electorate level,
like MP quality or pork barreling. Since we have general election results for 1990 at the
electorate level, we use them as a proxy for such unobservables. We cannot include any
results for Alliance, since it did not run prior to the 1993 election. We however include
New Labour in the regression, a small party that was founded in 1989 by former members
of the Labour party. New Labour ran in 1990, winning 5% of the votes and one seat (the
only party other than National and Labour to win a seat), and joined the coalition of
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parties that would run in 1993 under the name ‘Alliance’.
To be precise, our identification strategy works as follows: let MMP93ig be the share
of votes for MMP in polling station i, electorate g. Also define the difference in party
support in 1990 between National and Labour in electorate g as ∆90g . We run the following
regression:
(2) %MMP 93i,g = ∆
90
g + δi + εi
Since those who vote in polling station i electoral district g and those who vote in
polling station i electoral district h are observationally equivalent in their socioeconomic
characteristics, in essence, what we are doing is checking whether 1990 election results
have explanatory power on 1993 referendum choices over and above socioeconomic char-
acteristics.
[Table 6 about here]
Results from estimating equation (2) are shown in Table 6. Let us first note that, due
the the smaller sample size, non-linear effects are much harder to capture, so we omit
squared variables. Results further confirm party preferences as a key driver for electoral
system choice – the larger the vote share for National in the previous elections, the smaller
the support for MMP. The opposite relation holds for Labour and New Labour (the biggest
party other than the big two in 1990), with the magnitude of the effect being twice as
large for the latter. the larger the margin in favor of National in previous elections,
the smaller the share for MMP in 1993. The larger the support for a small party like
Alliance, the larger the vote share for MMP. Furthermore, when we add controls that
proxy for ‘degree of rurality’ (see specification 5), results shown above are also confirmed:
residents of relatively more rural electorates tend to support FPTP over and above party
considerations, even when controlling for their voting location.
Figure 6 shows the magnitude of these effects by plotting predicted support for MMP
from results in Table 6. In this case, vote shares for all three parties have similar magni-
tudes, but we can observe that confidence intervals are also much wider due to the smaller
sample size.
[Figure 6 about here]
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5.3 Results using survey data
To further check for the robustness of results displayed thus far, we use data from the
1993 New Zealand Election Study. The original data set consists of 2,251 post-election
respondents. Due to missing data issues, we can only use 1,296 subjects for our analysis.
Table VII in the Supplementary materials shows the descriptive statistics: there seem
to be no observable patterns for missing data. The survey contains the usual battery of
questions on socioeconomic background and political attitudes. The following is our main
regression specification:
(3) MMPi = α +Xiβ + POLiγ + εi,
where i refers to an individual respondent, Xi is a vector of individual socioeconomic
characteristics, and POLi is a vector of political preferences, attitudes, and values. All
results throughout are clustered at the electorate level. We include only those respondents
who voted in the referendum.
[Table 7 about here]
Table 7 shows the results. In column (1), we show that, as with field data, there is a
strong relationship between which party an individual voted for in the 1990 election and
whether they support FPTP or MMP in the referendum. In particular, those who voted
for Labour are more likely to support MMP relative to those that voted for National
and this difference in even larger for people who voted for other parties in 1990 and for
those who did not vote. These results are robust to the inclusion of controls for a wide-
range of characteristics. Columns (2) and (3) include further controls: first, a variable
that captures how much the respondent supports the core values of MMP (shares of MPs
equal to shares of votes, and coalition governments); and, second, degree of support for
the main three parties contesting in 1993. All results hold.
[Table 8 about here]
[Figure 7 about here]
Furthermore, survey data allows us to assess whether partisanship and ideology act
as complements or substitutes. To do so, we look at voters who support small parties
(hence, who are predicted to vote in favor of MMP) that are to the right of the political
spectrum (and, hence, predicted to vote against MMP): these are voters of New Zealand
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First, and Christian Heritage.29 Results are presented in Table 8: these unambiguously
show that partisanship is more important than ideology for these voters. Supporters of
New Zealand First were around 20 percentage points more likely to vote for MMP than
National voters, whereas supporters of Christian Heritage were around 10–18 percentage
points more likely.30
Examining individual characteristics, we find that, on average, men, Māori, highly
educated, leftist, and middle aged people were more likely to support MMP.31 We find
that, on the contrary, protestants, the main religious group in New Zealand, were more
likely to support FPTP. Unfortunately, the Census does not provide religious breakdown,
so we can only rely on survey data to study religion effects. The correlates of social values
and electoral system support are striking. We find that holding more progressive values is
clearly associated with having voted for MMP; rejecting death penalty, being in favor of
employing homosexuals, and being more open to immigrants is positively correlated with
having chosen MMP.
[Figure 8 about here]
Results also reveal that respondents who claimed to be ‘sometimes’, ‘often’ or ‘always’
angry with the economy were more likely to support MMP. Importantly, this result holds
even when controlling for past vote, support for principles of MMP, and support for
parties. In other words, anger at the economy was a key driver in the referendum vote
all across the political spectrum. Finally, perhaps unsurprisingly, people who support the
basic tenants of MMP, such as coalition governments and a fair mapping from votes to
seats, were in addition much more likely to support MMP.
Figure 8 shows the magnitude of some of these effects. In particular, we include the
effect of supporting Alliance (subfigure 8e) as a means of comparison. The effect of formal
education and progressive values is only marginally smaller than that of supporting for
a small party who could clearly benefit from MMP. The effect of anger at the economy
is even larger (although it reduces to around one half when including controls for party
29Unfortunately, the 1993 NZES survey did not include respondents’ perceptions of the left (0) – right
(10) position of these parties, but the 1996 survey did so. On average, New Zealand First was placed
at 5.4, whereas the Christian Coalition, the coalition that included Christian Heritage and the Christian
Democrat Party, was placed at 6.9. For reference, National and Labour were at 6.9 and 3.7.
30We would like to note that these results hinge on a small subset of our respondents: in our sample,
there are 102 voters of New Zealand First (7.9% of the total) and 18 of Christian Heritage (1.4%).
31Most specifications show that Māori are significantly more likely to support MMP. Nonetheless, Māori
are highly underrepresented in the 1993 sample. Hence, given the small number of observations, we prefer




We find consistent evidence in support of Hypothesis 1, that is, that voters rationally sup-
ported the electoral system that benefited their favorite party the most. The majority of
National supporters voted to keep FPTP, whereas Alliance supporters voted for a switch
to MMP, as both party elites encouraged. Remarkably, all our results are less clear with
regards to Labour supporters, which is very much in line with the ambiguous behavior
of its party elites. Whereas, on average, Labour supporters were more favorable towards
MMP, Labour strongholds did not vote for MMP as much as National strongholds did
for FPTP, as Figure 5 clearly shows. In terms of effect size, controlling for all possi-
ble individual characteristics, survey data reveals that voting for Labour increased the
probability of voting for MMP only half as much as voting for Alliance — see Figure 7 .
Expectations about voting patterns may have been particularly salient among National
voters: since the Second World War, Labour and National had typically gathered 80% of
the popular vote and virtually all seats in all elections. National had secured government
in 11 out of the 16 general elections, whereas Labour won the other five. Up to 1993, most,
if not all, smaller parties were left-leaning. In the eyes of many National supporters, this
meant that, should voting patterns stay the same after the referendum, the introduction
of a proportional system would probably result in Labour and smaller leftist parties easily
gaining the majority of parliamentary seats in every election. This is likely to have led a
vote for FTPT (i.e., status quo) among most instrumental National supporters.
Our hypotheses 2–5 reflect that there are potentially many other factors that drove
people’s choices over and above party allegiances. In particular, Hypothesis 2 implies
that socioeconomic status should influence choices. This is confirmed by the data. Three
socioeconomic characteristics are strong predictors: formal education, residence, and re-
ligion. We find that residing in urban areas and having higher levels of formal education
are strongly correlated with support for a proportional system. Results on formal educa-
tion are remarkable; once controlling for party preferences, vote at the general election,
and all sorts of social values and political attitudes, having any degree higher than a
primary school degree increases the probability of supporting a pure proportional system
by around 10–15%. This suggests that those with higher levels of formal education place
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some intrinsic value in a proportional system beyond the instrumental partisan value they
may see in it. Given the lack of malapportionment, support of urban citizens for MMP is
unlikely to stem from an urge to increase the weight of their own individual votes. Hence,
support of ‘urbanites’ and ‘leftists’ for MMP seems more likely to derive from the tendency
of these subsets of the population to antagonize National. It is also plausible that highly
educated, urban citizens, who have generally stronger concerns for the environment, may
have supported a proportional system in the hope of facilitating entrance to parliament
to the Green Party.
We also find religion to be a driver of electoral preferences. Followers of the main
religion in New Zealand (Protestantism) were much more supportive of maintaining FPTP
than their Catholic or agnostic counterparts. As far as we know, there is nothing intrinsic
in the Protestant set of beliefs that would favor a majoritarian system. As part of the
majoritarian religious group, Protestants may have seen little need to alter the status quo.
Results for income are mixed when using field data. On the one hand, median income
in the area unit is positively correlated with supporting FPTP. However, on the other,
larger proportions of lower-income households are also correlated with more support for
FPTP, whereas larger proportions of people earning rents and dividends is associated with
stronger support for MMP. Survey data does not shed any further light on the issue. In
sum, support for Hypothesis 2 is mixed at best, and, if anything, evidence leans towards
rejection: whereas those in urban areas and highly educated seem to vote against status
quo, those in the majoritarian religion group tend to vote in favor. Results on income do
not yield further clarifications.
Hypothesis 3 seems to find more support in the data: those who placed themselves
to the left of the political spectrum tended to support a proportional system. This re-
sult is however not robust to all specifications. In particular, we find that partisanship
trumps ideology, as supporters of small right-wing parties overwhelmingly tended to sup-
port MMP. Hypothesis 4 states that values and preferences for political processes are
determinants of referendum choice. Results show that, indeed, values and attitudes have
an impact on electoral preferences over and above party preferences and socioeconomic
characteristics. We use respondents attitudes towards immigration, the death penalty and
homosexuals to measure values. We find that being more progressive made respondents
more likely to support a proportional system. The effects are not trivial; someone who
strongly supports progressive values was around 10 to 25 percentage points more likely
21
to support MMP than someone who strongly supports conservative values (depending on
the specification).
There are two reasons why less conservative individuals could be more supportive of
a proportional system: (a) by principle, should they believe that a proportional system
is intrinsically more valuable than a majoritarian one; or (b) instrumental, should they
believe it is more conducive to bringing about progressive political outcomes. Unfortu-
nately, given our data, we cannot disentangle the actual effect of each of these rationales.
We suggest future research to bring insights on this issue.
Finally, Hypothesis 5 also seems to find support in the data: respondents who are
‘sometimes’ (44% of the total), ‘often’ or ‘always’ (34%) angry with the economy are
more likely to support MMP. This result holds even when controlling for vote choices
and party preferences. This has strong implications for referenda in general. The context
in New Zealand in the late 80s was of great disengagement with politics and politicians.
This was a result of a sudden and strong bulk of free market and liberalization measures
that were started out by a Labour government breaking its campaign promises and con-
tinued by the National government (Roper and Leitch, 1995). Therefore, it is most likely
that ‘angry’ respondents did not support MMP because of its intrinsic characteristics or
because of its potential for specific, long-term policy outcomes. On the contrary, they
may have supported MMP because it entailed change, and, furthermore, it was a vote
against the “out of touch” (Vowles, 2008) elites of both National and Labour. This has
remarkable similarities with recent elections like the Brexit referendum (2016) or the US
and Philippines presidential elections of 2016, where it is believed that many voters cast
uninformed votes and based their choices on anti-establishment sentiments and a sense of
economic disenfranchisement (Hobolt, 2016; Leonard, 2017).32
Last, despite not being formally part of any prediction, there are a few other results
we would like to discuss. Older people seemed to have preferred a conservative choice
(FPTP). Both field and survey results point in the same direction, although these results
are not robust to all specifications. Gender results are also mixed, but overall point in the
direction that women were on average more supportive of the status quo than men. Survey
results show that women were 5–10% more likely to support FPTP than men. We find the
differential effect to be specially pronounced among conservative voters. Pino (2017) uses
Chilean elections data and finds that women vote in a more conservative manner than
32For more on the discussion of the growth (or lack thereof) of anti-establishment voting and policy
platforms, see Goodwin and Heath (2016); Hooghe and Dassonneville (2018) and Hanley and Sikk (2016).
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men. We also find that Māori overwhelmingly supported MMP. We believe the answer
for this lies on the fact that, as discussed above, an increase to the number of Māori seats
was linked to a switch in electoral regime. This gave an incentive to Māori who wanted
to increase the number of Māori-only districts, beyond any particular considerations on
electoral system per se.
Overall, out of the five predictors of electoral system choice we discuss in Section
2, we find that partisan allegiances, social values, and political discontent best explain
how people voted in the New Zealand referendum. We also find suggestive evidence
that ideological placement matters, whereas we do not find a straightforward relationship
between socio-economic status and preferences.
7 Concluding remarks
This paper uses a novel strategy in order to ascertain what drives voters’ preferences for
electoral systems. It is the first one to use results from a binding referendum to that avail
(New Zealand, 1993). We find that voters preferences are mostly driven by partisan self-
interest: they support the system that most benefits their favorite party. However, this
paper further shows that a purely partisan instrumental model does not suffice to explain
voters choices: preferences towards particular democratic processes are also a key factor.
In other words, voters place an intrinsic value to processes and mechanisms implied by the
different electoral systems, beyond the particular policy outcomes that they may deliver.
In particular, we find that people with more progressive values overwhelmingly favor a
proportional rule.
Notably, we find that, regardless of socioeconomic status or party allegiances, people
who were upset with the economic situation were more likely to vote against the status
quo. At the margin, the size of the effect was not negligible in New Zealand: in a close
race such as the 1993 referendum, those who seemingly used the referendum to send a
signal to party elites may have been critical in securing a victory for the new proportional
system. This has notable implications for referenda overall: electors may be tempted to
use them to send a signal to politicians, regardless of the particular issue the referendum
may be addressing. Hence, results in this paper support the idea that timing of referenda
is critical.
Also, this paper uncovers another dimension of the rural-urban duality: the former
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prefer a majoritarian system, whereas the latter prefer a proportional one. Results suggest
that this duality is not driven by a preference or distaste for malapportionment. Further
research should serve to confirm if there is a preference for accountability in areas that
are distant from political power (mostly rural), and a preference for representativity in
urban areas.
Other issues also merit further inquiry: we find that religion is strongly correlated
with electoral system preferences. We conjecture that this reveals a preference for the
status quo among religious groups which are majoritarian and relatively well-off in eco-
nomic terms. Finally, we find that women are much more supportive of FPTP than men.
Whereas similar gender biases have been previously found in the literature, we cannot
provide any framework that accounts for such a difference. We hope that further research
will shed more light on the issues that have been left partially answered here.
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Table 1: Referenda and general election results
Panel A: Referenda results
Keep Change
FPTP system Total Turnout
space 1992 186,027 1,031,257 1,217,284 55.2%15.28% 84.72%
FPTP MMP
space 1993 884,964 1,032,919 1,917,833 85.2%46.14% 53.86%
Panel B: General election results
Party % Votes Seats Position referendum
National space 35.05 50 xPro FPTP
Labour 34.68 45 xAmbiguous
Alliance 18.21 2 xPro MMP
NZF 8.40 2 xPro MMP
Official results from the referendum held on September 19, 1992, and general elections and referendum
simultaneously held on November 6, 1993. Available at http://www.elections.org.nz.
Table 2: Summary statistics by polling station (General Roll only)
Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Panel A: all polling stations we can geo-locate, N = 3, 719
# Referendum votes 498.8 454.7 0 3094
% Votes for MMP 50.14% 12.73% 2.30% 84.0%
# (REF. – GE) votes -1.14 7.6 -142 106
# Gral. Election votes 499.9 454.8 0 3097
% National 40.40% 17.75% 0.72% 96.07%
% Labour 30.93% 16.03% 0% 88.88%
% Alliance 17.31% 8.67% 0% 71.57%
Panel B: General roll polling stations (sample used in the remainder), N = 3, 244
# Referendum votes + space504.66 + space447.83 + space0 3094
% Votes for MMP 50.12% 13.00% 2.30% 84.00%
# (REF. – GE) votes -0.08 3.92 -24 106
# Gral. Election votes 504.74 447.83 0 3097
% National 40.51% 18.40% 0.72% 96.07%
% Labour 30.63% 16.40% 0% 88.88%
% Alliance 17.59% 8.80% 0% 71.57%
†: Panel A excludes hospital votes, special votes in district before polling day, special votes on polling
day, overseas special votes including service personnel votes and ordinary votes in district before polling
day. Panel B further excludes polling stations in the Māori roll.
# (REF. – GE) votes = Votes in Referendum – Votes in General Election.
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Table 3: Support for MMP at the Polling Station (General Roll only)
(1)+s (2)+s (3)+s (4)+s (5)+s (6)+s
Mean MB Area -120.3** -98.34** -100.2** -45.69** -94.64** -40.05**
within AU (49.52) (42.44) (44.31) (22.51) (40.72) (19.70)
Pop. Density 1.320*** 0.879** 0.695* -0.247 0.525 -0.330
(0.403) (0.399) (0.411) (0.361) (0.380) (0.341)
% Women 0.415** 0.269 0.453** 0.152 0.457** 0.133
(0.189) (0.180) (0.185) (0.127) (0.186) (0.127)
% Born in NZ -0.277*** -0.247*** -0.256*** -0.156*** -0.235*** -0.142***
(0.0542) (0.0532) (0.0534) (0.0449) (0.0539) (0.0453)
% Maori 0.132*** 0.0306 0.0657 0.155*** 0.0941* 0.153***
(0.0483) (0.0501) (0.0534) (0.0415) (0.0534) (0.0409)
% > 64 y.o. -0.122 -0.297*** -0.248** -0.0646 -0.292*** -0.105
(0.0906) (0.103) (0.109) (0.0796) (0.107) (0.0780)
% < 25 y.o. -0.154 -0.112 -0.109 0.0042 -0.145 -0.0004
(0.0977) (0.101) (0.105) (0.0706) (0.0988) (0.0709)
% College degree 0.390*** 0.323*** 0.325*** 0.313*** 0.374*** 0.342***
(0.0635) (0.0692) (0.0779) (0.0749) (0.0781) (0.0765)
% < NZD 20,000 -0.0478 -0.297*** -0.230** -0.008
(0.0679) (0.0911) (0.108) (0.087)
Median income -0.377*** -0.304*** -0.286*** -0.151*** 0.640*** 0.254*
in $(000) (0.0502) (0.0615) (0.0617) (0.0377) (0.185) (0.143)
(Median income)2 -0.007*** -0.003***
in $(000) (0.001) (0.001)
% receives some 0.482*** 0.498*** 0.0563 0.589*** 0.164*
benefit (0.113) (0.135) (0.108) (0.128) (0.0949)
% Maori in Maori -0.0283 -0.0188 -0.0329 -0.0218
Roll (as in 1998) (0.0208) (0.0165) (0.0208) (0.0166)
% earns rents -0.0865 0.364*** -0.172 0.321**
or dividends (0.162) (0.125) (0.158) (0.126)
% full employment 0.176 0.202* 0.193* 0.167*
(0.125) (0.110) (0.107) (0.0957)
Party controls NO NO NO YES NO YES
R2 0.319 0.341 0.352 0.659 0.375 0.665
Observations 3,104 3,104 2,961 2,960 2,961 2,960
∗∗∗ Significant at 1% level; ∗∗at 5% level; ∗at 10% level.
Dependent variable: Percentage of votes for MMP at the Polling Station. All variables refer to Area Unit
level data. Population density: (People per km2)/1, 000. Party controls: share of votes for Labour, for
National, and for Alliance. Average MB area within AU: average size of meshblocks within the given Area
Unit (larger numbers denote rural areas). Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the electoral
district level. Regressions are weighted, where weights are given by the number of votes at the polling







Table 4: Support for MMP at the Polling Station, by party support, with sociodemographic
controls (General Roll only)
Dep. Var.: Support for PR at polling station (in %)



















% Nat. – % Lab. 0.3304***
(0.0569)
(% Nat. – % Lab.)2 -0.0025***
(0.0003)
Clustered SE YES YES YES YES
Weights YES YES YES YES
Controls YES YES YES YES
R2 0.6651 0.4023 0.4580 0.6503
Observations 2,961 2,961 2,960 2,960
∗∗∗ Significant at 1% level; ∗∗at 5% level; ∗at 10% level.
Dependent variable: Percentage of votes for MMP at the Polling Station. % National – % Labour =
100 + (% National – % Labour). Controls used (all refer to Area Unit level): mean meshblock area,
population density, % women, % born in NZ, % Māori, % college degree, % > 64 y.o., % < NZD 20,000,
median income, % Māori in Māori Roll, % earns rents or dividends, % receives some benefit, % full
employment. Standard errors clustered at the electoral district level. Regressions are weighted, where
weights given by number of votes at the polling station: ‘#referendum votes at the polling station/#
total referendum votes’.
Table 5: Pairwise matching strategy: one example
Share votes MMP %National – %Labour
District creating space Votes for MMP (Polling station level) (Electorate level, 1990)
(i) Polling station: Forrest Hill, Forrest Hill Road, Presbyterian Church Hall
Glenfield 110 44.50% 14.30%
North Shore 437 56.50% 28.30%
(ii) Polling station: Te Peka Street, K.C.E.P.B. Depot
King Country 39 36.10% 45.08%
Tongariro 89 51.10% 6.21%
(iii) Polling station: Petane Road, No. 58, King George Hall
Waikaremoana 185 54.50% 36.76%
Napier 434 61.30% -6.98%
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Table 6: Support for MMP at the Polling Station, pairwise matching





% New Labour 0.399*** 0.183 -0.0515
(0.109) (0.180) (0.176)






Clustered SE YES YES YES YES YES
Polling Station FE YES YES YES YES NO
R2 0.830 0.820 0.814 0.828 0.298
Observations 282 282 282 282 282
∗∗∗ Significant at 1% level; ∗∗at 5% level; ∗at 10% level.
Dependent variable: Percentage of votes for MMP at the Polling station. All vote shares refer to the
general election in 1990. ‘% Nat. - % Lab.’: difference in vote shares between both parties in the electorate
polling station i of electorate e. Electorate Area: Meshblock Area: # Polling stations in electorate. log
(area meshblock where polling station is located at). Standard errors clustered at the electorate level (75
clusters). Fixed effects: polling station.
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Table 7: Support for MMP, New Zealand Election Study, 1993 survey
spacece (1) spa spacece (2) spa spacece(3) spa
Vote 1990 = Labour 0.2252*** 0.1769*** 0.0827**
(base: vote 1990 = National) (0.0315) (0.0293) (0.0325)
Vote 1990 = Other 0.3089*** 0.2002*** 0.1201***
(0.0372) (0.0358) (0.0367)
Vote 1990 = None or 0.3592*** 0.2023*** 0.1522**
ineligible (0.0656) (0.0602) (0.0594)
Age 0.0126** 0.0090** 0.0069
(0.0049) (0.0045) (0.0045)
Age2/100 -0.0109** -0.0061 -0.0046
(0.0052) (0.0048) (0.0047)
Female -0.0706*** -0.0573** -0.0493**
(0.0254) (0.0230) (0.0221)
Income -0.0010 -0.0008 -0.0005
(0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0006)
Māori 0.1494** 0.1309** 0.1101
(base: white) (0.0620) (0.0620) (0.0668)
Immigrant 0.0640** 0.0273 0.0307
(0.0317) (0.0307) (0.0284)
School 0.0823** 0.0641** 0.0694**
(base: no qual.) (0.0349) (0.0323) (0.0316)
Non-univ. degree 0.1506*** 0.1084*** 0.1119***
(0.0366) (0.0333) (0.0326)
Univ. Degree 0.1524*** 0.1163*** 0.1302***
(0.0452) (0.0410) (0.0394)
Employed -0.0762 -0.0432 -0.0393
(base: retired) (0.0508) (0.0491) (0.0444)
Catholic 0.0103 0.0389 0.0346
(base: not religious) (0.0409) (0.0362) (0.0365)
Protestant -0.0821*** -0.0371 -0.0417*
(0.0272) (0.0246) (0.0239)
Left-Right -0.0552*** -0.0275** 0.0029
(0.0121) (0.0115) (0.0110)
Pol. Know. -0.0124 -0.0284 -0.0071
(0.0304) (0.0273) (0.0269)
Political participation 0.0462** 0.0364* 0.0443**
(0.0223) (0.0206) (0.0206)
Sometimes angry 0.1969*** 0.1286*** 0.0729**
(base: never/rarely) (0.0312) (0.0283) (0.0293)
Often/always angry 0.3208*** 0.2110*** 0.0640
(0.0390) (0.0360) (0.0399)
Favors conservative -0.0215*** -0.0083 -0.0098*
policies (0.0051) (0.0051) (0.0050)
Support principles 0.1244*** 0.1013***







R2 0.2984 0.4179 0.4565
Observations 1,296 1,286 1,286
∗∗∗ Significant at 1% level; ∗∗at 5% level; ∗at 10% level.
Dependent variable: Vote for MMP in the referendum (dummy). Standard errors clustered at the electorate level.
Pol. know.: knows the name of the local MP. Political participation: # general elections voted in since 1987. An-
gry economy: “I feel angry about the economy” (1=never; 2=seldom; 3=sometimes; 4=often; 5=always). Support Na-
tional/Labour/Alliance: 1=Strongly oppose; 5=Strongly support.
Favors conservative policies ∈ [−6, 6] = Pro-reducing # immigrants (∈ [−2, 2]) + Against employing homosexuals (∈ [−2, 2])
+ Favors death penalty (∈ [−2, 2]), where -2=Strongly disagree; 2=Strongly agree.
Support principles of MMP ∈ [−4, 4]: This variable is constructed using two questions from the NZES 1993 survey: (i)
F1d: “An election should give each party a share of the MPs equal to its share of the vote”, Strongly Agree (+2) Agree
(+1) Disagree (-1) Strongly disagree (-2); and (ii) F1c: “An election should ensure that one party can form a government”,
Strongly Agree (-2) Agree (-1) Disagree (+1) Strongly disagree (+2).
Omitted categories: ‘Don’t know/No Answer’ income; ‘other’ ethnic group; ‘other/student’ employment status; ‘other’
religion; ‘Don’t know/No Answer’ self Left-Right position; ‘Don’t know/No Answer’ angry with economy.
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Table 8: Support for MMP, New Zealand Election Study, 1993 survey
(1) (2) (3) (4)‡
Left-Right -0.002 -0.002 -0.008 -0.008
-0.011 -0.011 -0.013 -0.013
Support National -0.081*** -0.043*** -0.079*** -0.046***
-0.013 -0.015 -0.015 -0.017
Support Labour 0.022* 0.032** 0.017 0.027*
-0.012 -0.015 -0.012 -0.014
Support Alliance 0.048*** 0.038*** 0.045*** 0.035**
-0.013 -0.014 -0.013 -0.014
Support NZF 0.034*** 0.025* 0.023 0.015
-0.013 -0.014 -0.014 -0.016
Support Christian Heritage 0.016 0.014
-0.013 -0.013
1993 Vote: None/Other 0.132* 0.081
(base: vote for National) -0.077 -0.085
1993 Vote: Labour 0.131*** 0.105**
-0.045 -0.049
1993 Vote: Alliance 0.223*** 0.208***
-0.041 -0.048
1993 Vote: New Zealand First 0.209*** 0.186***
-0.051 -0.059
1993 Vote: Christian Heritage 0.170* 0.089
-0.088 -0.089
R2 0.461 0.475 0.475 0.487
Observations 1,236 1,236 1,024 1,024
∗∗∗ Significant at 1% level; ∗∗at 5% level; ∗at 10% level.
Dependent variable: Vote for MMP in the referendum (dummy). Standard errors clustered at the electorate level.
All regressions include the same controls as Column (3) of Table 7.
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Figures
Figure 1: New Zealand 1993 electorates.
Left figure: Māori roll districts. Right figure: General roll districts. The colors refer to the general election
results: Red=Labour victory. Blue=National victory. Black=New Zealand First victory. Green=Alliance
victory.
Figure 2: Distribution of support for MMP
(a) Across all polling stations (b) Across all electorates
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Figure 3: Geographical distribution of support for MMP and the three biggest parties
(a) Support for MMP (b) Support for National
(c) Support for Labour (d) Support for Alliance
Darker tones denote more support. Natural breaks used: Figure 3a (0-12%; 12-35%; 36-47%; 48-55%;
56-62%; 62-82%). Figure 3b (1-21%; 22-33%; 34-45%; 46-59%; 60-82%). Figure 3c (3-20%; 21-31%;
32-42%; 43-54%; 55-82%). Figure 3d (3-13%; 14-18%; 19-25%; 26-38%; 39-63%)
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spaLocal (unconditional) polynomial smooth plot
spawith 95% confidence intervals: support for MMP
spaas a function of support for Labour (upper left),
spaNational (upper right), and Alliance (left).
spaEach dot in the figure is a polling station.
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Figure 5: Predicted support for MMP, by party support
(a) Conditional on the share of votes for National at the
polling station – specification (1) in Table 4.
(b) Conditional on the share of votes for Labour at the












(c) Conditional on the share of votes for Alliance at the
polling station, fixing the shares of National and Labour to
be the same. Note: the maximum share for Alliance at any
polling station is 72%. Specification (4) in Table 4.
Predicted shares for MMP taken from Table 4 (95% confidence intervals plotted). See expression (1) for
the regression specification.
Figure 6: Predicted support for MMP by party support, using matched polling stations only
Predicted shares for MMP taken from Table 6 (95% confidence intervals plotted). See expression (2) for
the regression specification.
Figure 7: Predicted support for MMP by party support, survey data
Predicted probability of voting for MMP taken from (3) in Table 7 (95% confidence intervals plotted).
See expression (3) for the regression specification.
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Figure 8: Predicted support for MMP, by individual beliefs, values, and socioeconomic
characteristics (95% confidence intervals plotted). All figures (unless otherwise stated) are
derived from specification (3) in Table 7. See expression (1) for the regression specification.
(a) By level of education (b) By social values
(c) By anger at the economy (from specification (1) in
Table 7) (c) By anger at the economy
(e) By support to Alliance (same as in Figure 7, included
here to facilitate comparison of magnitude to other
explanatory variables). c
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